Alitalia’s new commissioner has detailed proposals for trimming part of the Italian carrier’s operations, during meetings with key unions. Commissioner Giuseppe Leogrande took over as a single commissioner for the carrier, which remains in extraordinary administration, after plans fell through for a consortium of investors to take over the airline. Union FIT-CISL says Leogrande informed members of proposals to close unprofitable routes and reduce the fleet by three aircraft, from 113 to 110. The aircraft would be withdrawn through the end of leases. Union FILT-CGIL says the network closures would be aimed at long-haul routes. FILT-CGIL chief Fabrizio Cuscito says: “There was also talk of the possible impact of route closures on the extent of lay-offs for pilots and cabin crew.” But no details have been finalised, he adds. Cuscito warns that the need for sacrifices regarding Alitalia’s reshaping “cannot fall again on workers”. FIT-CISL says the commissioner advised that the entire company is being examined for areas of improvement. But the union says the economic development minister needs to convene a meeting with the workers’ representatives and “tell us what he wants to do with Alitalia”. FIT-CISL points out that the collapse of Air Italy indicates that the entire supply chain, rather than individual airlines, is showing signs of problems.

Source: Cirium

Kenyan investigators have disclosed that the crew of a Fokker 50 continued a take-off roll, despite multiple alerts apparently warning of a serious engine problem, before the aircraft crashed some 50s after becoming airborne. The inquiry into the 2014 accident, involving a Skyward International Aviation turboprop departing Nairobi’s main international airport, found that 27 high-level ‘triple-chime’ alerts had sounded as the aircraft rolled along runway 06. Aural alerts had commenced as early as 8s after the take-off was initiated but, while the aircraft was well below the V1 decision speed, the crew did not act to abort the take-off roll. Flight-data recorder information indicates that the left-hand Pratt & Whitney Canada PW125 engine was exhibiting problems, with increasing torque but declining propeller speed compared with the right-hand engine. “On [its] ground roll for take-off, the aircraft seemed to take [more] runway than anticipated before attaining the take-off speed,” the Kenyan air accident investigation department states, indicating that the roll lasted over 90s. The aircraft lifted off from the high-elevation airport at about 100kt but “barely climbing”, the inquiry says, reaching no more than 50ft above ground after about 20s while continually deviating to the left of the extended centreline. It subsequently collided with a building 2,100m north-north-east of the runway end. None of the four occupants – two pilots, an engineer and a loadmaster – survived. The aircraft had been conducting a cargo service to Mogadishu, in darkness, on 2 July 2014. Investigators found discrepancies in the loadsheet for the aircraft and analysis of the cargo, including a shipment of the mild narcotic qat, indicated that the aircraft was 500-1,500kg above its maximum certified gross weight at take-off. The captain, who had been flying, had logged over 6,800h in command of Fokker 50s, although the inquiry says it was “unable to determine” whether either pilot had demonstrated an ability to fly the turboprop with one engine inoperable.
Analysis of recordings from the previous positioning flight by the aircraft (5Y-CET) showed a ‘three-chime’ alert had occurred, and that the crew spent time trying to diagnose the problem. Despite the evidence from the cockpit-voice recorder, the monitoring pilot for the flight “denied knowledge” of any anomalies, says the inquiry. Investigators could not obtain any evidence that any problem was recorded in the technical log, nor that any maintenance was conducted in relation to the apparent anomaly. At least one of the crew members – possibly the captain – from the positioning flight was among those fatally injured during the subsequent accident. While the ‘three-chime’ alert sounded repeatedly during the ill-fated flight’s take-off roll, the inquiry says “it is not clear” why the crew continued to proceed with the flight, particularly given that Fokker documentation requires an abort under such circumstances. Cirium fleets data shows the aircraft was originally delivered to Lufthansa CityLine in 1992 and served with Air Nostrum and Avianca Brazil before being transferred to Skyward from Dutch operator Denim in May 2014. It had been operated in Kenya for just 92h before the crash. Although the accident occurred in 2014, the inquiry was only signed off at the end of November last year and published by the transport ministry in January.

Source: Cirium

South Africa’s auditor general’s office has testified to the chaotic condition of South African Airways’ organisation during a judicial commission examining allegations of corruption and fraud in state companies. The office participated for the first time in the audit of SAA’s full-year financial statement covering 2016-17. SAA was experiencing liquidity problems and could not provide the office with the financial statements until October 2017, five months behind schedule. Auditor general business executive Polani Sokombela described as “quite dire” some aspects of SAA’s organisation, and detailed multiple concerns picked up during its audit of the company’s financial state. Sokombela told the inquiry on 21 February that the airline was experiencing “a lot of instability” at the time, with more than 40% of its executive committee positions filled in an acting capacity. There was no permanent chief executive, or head of finances, commercial activity, and strategy, and SAA did not have sufficient aviation specialists at board level. Nor did the carrier have enough individuals with “appropriate competencies” regarding preparation of financial statements, understanding of regulations for supply-chain management, or compliance with the South African treasury’s framework on performance reporting. “That had a negative impact. We ended up having a lot of findings in those areas,” said Sokombela, adding that compliance with legislation was a “serious challenge” at SAA. The airline’s annual report, he pointed out, admitted to irregular expenditure of R125 million, a sharp rise on the previous year’s figure. But Sokombela says the auditor general’s office could not find evidence of “consequence management” – namely any sanction against transgressors. He also pointed to a lack of capacity in the legal divisions tasked with overseeing SAA contract management. While successful suppliers were notified by letter when awarded a tender, he said, this was not always accompanied by a formal contract. “That, in our view, was a big risk for SAA,” said Sokombela. “Because if you don’t have a contract signed with your suppliers, how are you going to control them?” He told the inquiry that this situation – with little control over quality or even existence of supply – had probably been “going on for quite some time”. SAA had a “very big” contract register, he said, but for the “majority” of them the auditor general’s office “could not find the signed contracts”, meaning the credibility of the register was “questionable”. “When we were there and we looked at the state of affairs, it was quite dire,” he added. Sokombela described SAA’s record-keeping as a “significant concern”, telling the inquiry that obtaining information would sometimes take three months. “This has resulted in significant limitations of scope on our side, due to that issue, especially in the areas of supply-chain management and also assets of SAA,” he said. South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, who established the judicial inquiry into state capture in 2018, authorised investigators earlier this month to probe allegations of corruption and unlawful conduct at the carrier.

Source: Cirium