UK regulators are warning that European airlines might not be completely exempt from passenger compensation payments relating to the coronavirus outbreak, although much of the disruption is likely to fall under ‘extraordinary circumstance’ immunity. The Civil Aviation Authority has outlined its interpretation of European Union compensation rules in light of the outbreak. It says the EU passenger rights legislation is “applicable at all times” including the “unprecedented” coronavirus situation. But it acknowledges that – in the event of flight cancellations – airlines could face “significant practical difficulties” in providing alternative flights, and refunds could be the only realistic measure available. While fixed-sum compensation might ordinarily apply to flight cancellations, the CAA believes coronavirus containment measures – such as government advisories against travel, or regulatory activity which restricts airline operations – would be viewed as extraordinary circumstances, exempting carriers from such compensation obligations. Airlines might choose to cancel flights at short notice to avoid costly operation of services with only a small number of passengers on board. “Such [situations] may be viewed as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under [the EU regulation] and therefore the fixed-sum compensation would not be payable,” the CAA states, but cautions: “This may not be the case in all circumstances.” Although the CAA says it is “cognisant” of the current difficult operating conditions for airlines, and believes it should act proportionately and concentrate on harmful “systematic” issues, it nevertheless expects carriers to act in the interests of their passengers. “On this basis, we will look to airlines to demonstrate that they are being pro-active and flexible in managing the situation and minimising the impact on passengers of the disruption,” it says. It adds that its interpretation of ‘extraordinary circumstances’ is only a guide and each individual case will have its own specific facts to consider. Passengers will be able to seek legal redress if they disagree with the regulator’s view.

Source: Cirium

Investigators probing the fatal Ethiopian Airlines Boeing 737 Max accident have given additional insight into a crucial period during which the crew, having temporarily stopped the aircraft from automatically nosing down, struggled vainly to regain pitch and trim control. In an interim update into the 10 March 2019 crash near Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian accident investigation bureau says the differences training provided by Boeing – to convert 737 pilots to the 737 Max – was “inadequate”. It adds that the reliance of the controversial Manoeuvring Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) on a single angle-of-attack sensor input left it “vulnerable to undesired activation”. When the sensor, on the left-hand side of the jet, started transmitting bad angle-of-attack data, MCAS responded by repeatedly triggering the stabiliser trim to force the aircraft’s nose down, and causing the pilots to counter by pulling on their control columns. But while MCAS triggered on four occasions, the third of these had no effect on the aircraft’s pitch because – for a period of 2min 33s – the crew had been flying the jet with the stabiliser trim cut-out engaged. Engaging the trim cut-out de-activates MCAS and, for this critical period, the crew would not have been battling directly against MCAS to control the aircraft’s pitch. The inquiry says the captain, at this point, succeeded in increasing the aircraft’s pitch, and the 737 started climbing at 1,800ft/min. He asked for the first officer to “pull with me” and, over the 2min 33s interval, the crew was applying an average of 94lb force to the control column. Pitch varied between 7° nose-up and 2° nose-down, increasing when both pilots pulled and falling when only a single pilot pulled, and this resulted in the vertical speed swinging between a 4,400ft/min climb and a 2,500ft/min descent. Air traffic control approved a request from the crew to climb to 14,000ft in order to troubleshoot their flight-control problems. The aircraft was travelling at excessive speed, some 360-375kt, and the captain made a “speed” call-out, which was acknowledged by the first officer. The captain again sought the first officer’s help to pitch the aircraft nose-up, and then asked him whether the trim was functional. The first officer replied that the trim was not functioning, and asked if he could try to activate it manually, but subsequently stated: “It is not working.” At the time of the first officer’s comment, the aircraft was mis-trimmed and flying at 340kt. Simulations of the flight, with the thrust and trim settings at the time, aimed to evaluate the control column forces required for the climb and to turn the trim wheel. With both simulator pilots pulling they achieved a nose-up pitch of 5-10°. But the inquiry says: “The forces needed from both pilots to achieve this were considered significantly very high and unbearable for the duration held.” The simulations also revealed that, for the trim setting, the pilots could not move the trim wheel manually at speeds above 220kt. Several times the Ethiopian aircraft’s captain remarked “keep with me”, stating that they should continue climbing to 14,000ft. But the crew then decided instead to return to the airport. The inquiry states that, shortly afterwards, manual electric trim-up inputs were recorded, indicating that the stabiliser cut-out had been disengaged – enabling MCAS to continue triggering nose-down stabiliser trim. Investigators have not specifically stated why, having been engaged, the cut-out was subsequently disengaged, and whether this related to the difficulties with pulling the control column or turning the trim wheel. But the inquiry states that, with MCAS again active, the remainder of the flight lasted just 33s as it pushed the aircraft into its final fatal descent.

Source: Cirium

Investigators have revealed a fourth incident involving a Boeing 787 deviation from the localiser path, during an ILS approach to runway 25R at Hong Kong last year. The incident occurred to an Ethiopian Airlines 787-8 which had been arriving on 18 July. It had been cleared for the ILS approach to 25R but, shortly after passing the RIVER waypoint, the aircraft “kept diverging” to around 1nm north of the approach path, says the Hong Kong Air Accident Investigation Authority. The twinjet (ET-ASG) also descended to an altitude of 3,700ft, coming within 570m horizontally of terrain rising to 3,277ft. Air traffic controllers transmitted a warning to the crew and instructed the flight to climb to 4,500ft, after which the aircraft positioned for another ILS approach and a safe landing. While none of the 235 occupants was injured, the incident bears a remarkable similarity to three other events – all involving 787s – which took place over the following three months, all in the vicinity of the RIVER waypoint during approaches to 25R. The RIVER waypoint is about 16nm from runway 25R and close to the Tai Mo Shan peak. Two of the three subsequent incidents occurred to Virgin Atlantic 787-9s while the other involved an Etihad Airways 787-9. Ethiopian’s service had been arriving from Manila, in darkness, at the time of its deviation. Weather conditions and visibility were good, according to meteorological data from Hong Kong airport. All of the events are under investigation.

Source: Cirium