Pilots of a BMI Regional Embraer ERJ-145 were caught out by false ILS signals before the jet was involved in a serious airprox incident with a light aircraft during approach to Norrkoping airport last year. The ERJ-145, inbound from Munich, had been south-east of the airport, heading north. Its crew had requested to self-position for an ILS approach to runway 27. This involved navigating towards a point on the extended approach path, then turning left to line up and follow the ILS. But before reaching the centerline, 7nm to the north, the aircraft intercepted a false localiser signal offset from the centerline by 42° to the south. As a result the aircraft – flying at 2,100ft with its ILS approach mode armed – started turning to the left to follow the false localiser path, heading north-west, rather than west, towards the airport. At the time of the turn the light aircraft, an ATEC Zephyr 2000, had been flying west in uncontrolled airspace at 1,400ft. Swedish investigation authority SHK believes the controller did not consider the ERJ's premature turn to be unusual, because the crew had asked to self-position, while the pilots were probably distracted by the appearance of conflicting traffic on their collision-avoidance system. "The crew was not aware of the risk that a false localiser signal could be captured by the aircraft's ILS," it adds. SHK conducted a test flight in the region and determined that there was not only a false localiser signal in the region of the incident but a glideslope signal as well, which the test flight followed from 2,100ft to 1,600ft. The inquiry says that this false glideslope was also "probably followed" by the ERJ, which commenced a descent from its cleared altitude of 2,100ft. Shortly after turning onto the false localiser path, the ERJ crew made a break-off turn towards the south. But the descent profile and the break-off meant the ERJ started converging on the Zephyr's flightpath. The ERJ crew, who had visual contact with the Zephyr, executed a go-around. SHK says the ERJ had descended to 1,600ft – despite the crew's repeatedly insisting to air traffic control that they had maintained their assigned altitude – and it came within 0.85nm and 200ft of the Zephyr.

Source: FlightGlobal

Airbus A380 operators are set to be instructed to check for cracks in the trailing edge, and trailing-edge devices, of the double-deck type. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency says the directive is intended to prevent in-flight loss of parts from the trailing edge, following findings of cracks in devices on both sides. Airbus has addressed the situation with service bulletins covering inspection instructions for various locations and modifications to achieve design service targets The EASA directive lists some 30 structures for inspection, with individual service bulletins identifying the specific A380 airframes to which they apply. These structures include ribs, actuator brackets and actuator clevis assemblies at a number of spoiler locations. EASA's proposed directive mentions that several of the structures are "made from 7449". Airbus has previously experienced a wing component cracking issue which involved an aluminium alloy known as type 7449, an issue which resulted in an extensive retrofit programme and use of a more robust alloy. EASA says the new detailed inspections of the trailing edge and trailing-edge devices need to be carried out within 147 months of the A380 date of manufacture, and then at six-year intervals.

Source: FlightGlobal

Indian investigators have revealed that an Air India Airbus A319 which suffered a severe hard landing at Chennai was released to continue flying and not taken out of service for five days. The aircraft had landed on Chennai's runway 25, with a descent rate of 400ft/min, touching down initially with a 1.6g impact before bouncing. Five seconds later it contacted the runway again, this time with a descent rate of 912ft/min, and the impact was much harder at more than 3.5g. Airbus considers a hard landing to be above 2.6g and a severe hard landing to be above 2.86g. The Indian DGCA says an automatic load report was not generated, and the captain instead took a manual report from the computer – which showed a 1.59g impact – and consulted with a maintenance engineer. It points out that only a verbal exchange took place and the matter was not recorded in the technical log. After a visual inspection, and in the absence of a formal abnormal record, the aircraft was released to service. It then operated for a further 30 sectors over the next few days until, on 3 October, a routine flight-operations monitoring analysis picked up the unusually-high 3.5g impact recorded during the landing. Airbus subsequently examined the flight-data recorder information and classified the event as a severe hard landing, adding that preliminary assessment showed "exceedance" of loads on the fuselage, wings and main landing-gear. The aircraft, a 2009 airframe, was eventually grounded in Bangalore on 4 October, five days after the incident. Investigators have determined that the bounced landing resulted from the first officer's keeping the throttle in the 'climb' position instead of retarding it to idle – the position necessary to ensure spoiler deployment. The flare was initiated at 25ft but the first officer applied "excessive" pitch input, it adds. This combination of thrust setting and pitch, which reached 5.6° nose-up, meant the aircraft became airborne again after the initial runway contact. The captain noticed the incorrect thrust position and took over the controls, retarding the throttle, but did not realise the "quantum of bounce", says the inquiry, and the effort to smooth the touchdown failed, resulting in the second, hard impact. None of those on board – comprising 59 passengers and six crew – were injured. The aircraft (VT-SCU) did not suffer damage, despite the severity of the landing.

Source: FlightGlobal