Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia is to be rebranded as Sunclass Airlines after the collapsed tour operator Thomas Cook Group's Northern Europe division was acquired by a trio of investors. The investors include Strawberry Group, the fund controlled by businessman Petter Stordalen, as well as Altor Funds and TDR Capital. Strawberry Group and Altor will each hold 40% with TDR taking the remaining 20%. This investment consortium will provide a "strong and long-term" Nordic majority ownership of the leisure company and its 2,300 personnel, says Strawberry Group. Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia has continued operating despite the liquidation of its parent company in September. The collapsed leisure firm's Northern Europe operation is also known as Ving Group, and includes tour operator activities in Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland – among them firms such as Spies and Tjareborg. Ving Group says its core business is chartered holiday travel with Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia accounting for 85% of its volume. Group chief executive Magnus Wikner says the investors' "long experience" in the industry combined with financial strength will give the company "long-term stability" and the opportunity to develop. Stordalen says the company has a portfolio of "strong Nordic brands" and amounts to a "crown jewel" among the region's tour operators. "It's a fantastic business that has ended up in a very unfortunate situation," says Altor partner Harald Mix. He says that, through a restructuring scheme, the new owners will secure SKr6 billion ($620 million) in liquidity and guarantees. The various operations are being moved to a new group, with some of the component firms filing for a technical bankruptcy to enable them to be taken over by the newly-established group being set up by the consortium. Thomas Cook Airlines Scandinavia will be renamed Sunclass Airlines. The carrier currently operates around 14 aircraft, a mix of Airbus A330s and A321s.

Source: FlightGlobal

Italian investigators have disclosed that there were no engine de-pairing requirement in place for the Rolls-Royce Trent 1000s fitted to a Norwegian Boeing 787 before one of its powerplants failed after take-off from Rome. The engines were subject to a modification – under a service bulletin designated 72-H818 – which introduced an intermediate-pressure turbine blade with a different parent material and coating, to protect against corrosion and fatigue due to sulphidation. A separate service bulletin had set out a de-pairing life to protect against the risk of dual engine failure. Italian investigation authority ANSV says Rolls-Royce used statistical models, based on blade sampling and fleet data analysis, to derive a blade life limit for different groups of serial numbers. This enabled a further bulletin to set a blade hard life which was significantly lower than that at which certain in-service engines – those which had yet to receive the newly-developed blades – would have to be de-paired. As a result, says ANSV, Rolls-Royce agreed with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency to remove the de-pairing requirement. But the failure of the left-hand engine on the Norwegian 787-8, on 10 August, occurred 1,210 cycles after the installation of its intermediate-pressure turbine module – failing 200 cycles before its hard life limit of 1,410 cycles. The aircraft's other engine had performed more cycles – a total of 1,337 – and was even closer, just 103 cycles, to its own limit of 1,440. ANSV says this showed the hard life limit was "not sufficient" to avoid a detrimental effect on safety, and left the aircraft vulnerable to dual engine failure, particularly given that a remaining operative engine "undergoes overall higher solicitations". It has recommended that EASA evaluate de-pairing criteria for engines yet to receive new blades, in order to avoid two such engines being installed on the same aircraft. ANSV acknowledges that Rolls-Royce, on 19 September, revised the service bulletin for managing these engines, reducing the blade life limit for specific engine serial numbers. EASA endorsed this revision through an airworthiness directive on 18 October, which takes effect from 1 November. Norwegian's 787 sustained damage not only to the engine exhaust cone but also the left wing, flap fairing, horizontal stabiliser, fuselage and main landing-gear tyres. Debris shed from the powerplant damaged a total of 28 cars and three building awnings.

Source: FlightGlobal

Investigators have determined that an Air Vanuatu ATR 72-500 crew misdiagnosed an engine failure as an electrical smoke problem and consequently referred to the wrong checklist, unwittingly disengaging systems which were not malfunctioning. This left several crucial systems, including brakes and steering, unavailable to the pilots who were then unable to prevent the ATR veering off the runway at Port Vila and crashing into a pair of parked aircraft. The aircraft, bound for Port Vila from Tanna on 28 July last year, suffered a right-hand engine failure while in cruise.
Papua New Guinea's accident investigation commission says smoke travelled from the engine, through the air-conditioning system, into the cabin, cockpit and avionics bay. This triggered a smoke detector in the avionics and electrical compartment and generated an electrical smoke warning – misleading the crew as to the nature of the problem, and prompting them to follow the 'electrical smoke' emergency checklist. The checklist required de-activation of generators and, as a result, the aircraft's main hydraulic pumps were no longer available. This mean the aircraft's main-gear brakes and nose-wheel steering were rendered inoperative. Investigators state that the crew also shut down the right-hand engine after a low oil-pressure warning. Shutting down the engine meant the rudder's travel limitation unit remained locked in high-speed mode, restricting rudder deflection. The aircraft was flying at 201kt at the time. This limitation unit would normally switch automatically to low-speed mode, offering greater rudder authority, when the aircraft decelerated through 180kt. Engine shutdown inhibited this automatic switching, however, and required the pilots to switch to low-speed mode manually to free the rudder. But the crew did not consult the 'before landing' checklist, which meant the rudder stayed locked and offered significantly limited directional authority when the aircraft landed. As the ATR touched down and rolled out, both engine power levers were set to maximum reverse-thrust. With only the left-hand engine operating this generated asymmetric thrust, and the aircraft veered to the left of runway 29. "Use of reverse thrust under the prevailing circumstances was inappropriate," the commission says. The crew was unable to use either the brakes or the nose-wheel steering – owing to the loss of the hydraulic pumps – or the locked rudder to correct the deviation or slow the aircraft. Although the emergency brake was available, the pilots failed to use it. After veering off the runway the aircraft rolled across a taxiway and slowed to around 45kt before colliding with two parked Britten-Norman BN-2 Islanders, substantially damaging both. The inquiry stresses that the engine failure did not cause the landing accident, and pilots are normally trained to land aircraft with an engine inoperative. "Apart from the engine, none of the aircraft systems, including electrical and hydraulic systems, malfunctioned in-flight," it states. "The loss and unavailability of these systems, was induced by flight crew action." Although the ATR sustained serious damage, none of the 39 passengers and four crew members was injured.

Source: FlightGlobal