The head of the Federal Aviation Administration is giving no clue about when his agency might clear Boeing's 737 Max to fly. But when addressing attendees at the ALTA Airline Leaders Forum on 28 October, FAA administrator Stephen Dickson stressed repeatedly that his agency will not clear the aircraft to fly until Boeing fully addresses all the FAA's safety concerns. "The FAA's return-to-service decision will be based solely on our assessment of the sufficiency of Boeing's proposed software update and training" recommendations, Dickson told a packed crowd of ALTA attendees. He insists that the FAA will cut no corners and is completing a new safety review – a message coming amid global concern about seeming lapses in the FAA's original certification of the Max. That concern has led some regulators outside the USA to reconsider the traditional certification approach under which they essentially rubber-stamp the FAA's aircraft type certificates. The European Union Aviation Safety Agency, for instance, has committed to conducting an independent Max review. The aircraft has been grounded globally since March following the October 2018 crash of a Lion Air Max 8 and the March crash of an Ethiopian Airlines aircraft of the same model. Lion Air investigators have pinned that accident on Boeing's flight control system, shortcomings in the FAA's certification and lapses by Lion Air, among other factors. "Other civil regulators have to take their own actions to return the 737 Max to service." Dickson says. "The civil aviation authorities must know we are not resting on the previous safety analysis." Latin American carriers have acquired or ordered nearly 300 737 Max jets, Cirium fleets data shows. Boeing last week said it anticipates regulators will approve the Max's certification before year-end, though the FAA has disclosed no timeline. Dickson concedes the FAA must improve its industry oversight and suggests his agency will adopt some of the various certification improvement recommendations issued by various groups in recent weeks. Recommendations have come from the National Transportation Safety Board, Indonesian accident investigators and an FAA-convened safety panel composed of aviation safety experts from numerous countries. "The FAA is fully committed to address all the recommendations, with special emphasis on those that pertain to returning the 737 Max to service," Dickson says. "What we have done in the past and what we are doing today will not be good enough for the future."

Source: FlightGlobal

Operators of Airbus A220s are facing operational limitations of the twinjet's engines, following several serious incidents involving powerplant failure. Transport Canada has issued an emergency directive covering both the A220-100 and A220-300 models, which are exclusively fitted with Pratt & Whitney PW1500G engines. Swiss has suffered three recent engine failures on A220-300s during an early stage of flight. Preliminary indications indicate that operation of engines with certain thrust ratings at high thrust settings during high-altitude climbs "may be a contributor" to the events, says Transport Canada. But it adds that investigation is continuing to determine the root cause. The directive, which warns of a risk of uncontained engine failure and damage to the aircraft, orders operators to limit the engine power to 94% of N1 while above 29,000ft. Any exceedance lasting more than 20s must be reported, it adds. Pilots are also being instructed to disengage the autothrottle before initiating step climbs while above 29,000ft. This is to "respect" the N1 limitation, the directive states. The autothrottle can be engaged as required once the aircraft is stabilised in the cruise but engine power must be monitored to ensure it does not rise above the 94% N1 threshold. Transport Canada says the directive, an interim measure, applies to A220s equipped with PW1524G, PW1524G-3 or PW1521G-3 engines. Operators must comply within seven days, it adds.

Source: FlightGlobal

Pilots of the Lion Air Boeing 737 Max which crashed shortly after departing Jakarta last October had been unaware of the control problems experienced by the crew of the same aircraft on the inbound service, investigators have disclosed. This inbound service – from Denpasar – had taken place after the aircraft underwent replacement of an angle-of-attack sensor. Its crew had known about the rectification, and Indonesian investigation authority KNKT says this awareness of the aircraft's condition "may have helped" when the pilots encountered control problems after take-off from Denpasar. As it lifted off, the stick-shaker activated owing to misalignment of the replacement angle-of-attack sensor and the aircraft automatically started repeatedly trimming nose-down. KNKT says the crew carried out non-normal checklists, including those for unreliable airspeed and runaway stabiliser, and activated the stabiliser trim cut-out to regain control of the jet. Despite a continuing stick-shaker activation, and the indications of a runaway stabiliser, the captain chose to continue the flight to Jakarta – a decision which the inquiry says was "highly unusual". After the aircraft arrived and parked in Jakarta, it adds, the captain made entries into the maintenance log referring to three particular problems experienced during the flight, but "did not mention" the activation of the stick-shaker, as he believed this was a symptom of the other issues. Nor did the captain report the runaway stabiliser or the activation of the stabiliser trim cut-out. The crew had returned the cut-out switches to their normal position after landing. Finding the cut-out switches engaged, says the inquiry, would have provided "additional information" to the maintenance engineers. It says the captain's lack of understanding of the relationship between the system failures and their effects meant his maintenance log report was "incomplete", and points out that full reporting is "critical" for engineers to maintain aircraft airworthiness. Failure to record information may have been crucial, because one of the next crew's responsibilities is to examine the maintenance log and inquire about the technical status of the aircraft before flight. KNTK says an "absence" of discussion by the next crew regarding the problems that had affected the inbound flight suggests the pilots might not have been aware of the issues, and the possibility of recurrence. This lack of awareness – particularly of the stick-shaker activation and the uncommanded nose-down trim – would have lessened the ability of the crew to predict, and prepare to mitigate, similar problems. When the aircraft took off again from Jakarta, the stick-shaker and MCAS activated repeatedly, similarly to the way they had behaved on the inbound flight. But the pilots, caught by surprise, were far less effective than the previous crew at diagnosing and dealing with the problem.

Source: FlightGlobal